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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
IN THE 3fATTER OF THE
ESTATE OF
J _._t~l\fES W. LINFORD,

Case No. 4040
RESPONDENTS'

BRIEF

Deceased.

COJ.llJ.llENTS ON "'STATEMENT OF FACTS"

Appellant's "Staten1ent of Facts" is spotty and
very incomplete and 1nisleading. Some points and
argtunents, settled in the first appeal in this estate,
In Re Linford's Estate, 207, P. 2nd 1033, (Ut.), are
repeated 'vhile important and controlling facts are omitted, and many improper and 1nisleading inferences are
sought to be drawn.
For exa1nple: (1), On page 2 it is stated that notice
of her "Final Account and Petition for Su1nmary Distribution'' 'Yas duly mailed to respondents, ''that no
objections 'vere n1ade or entered, and on Dec. 26, 1942,
the court signed a decree of Summary Distribution ...
Whereupon Mrs. Linford, assuming the business to be
hers as she had been given all of the assets by Court
Decree, proceeded to operate it, 'vorking long hours,
until Oct. 15, 1945, 'vhen she sold the entire business
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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including the real estate to vV1n. A. Jones for $6,000.00.. '
But appellant fails to state, as the uncontradicted
testimony of Jean H. Linford sho,vs, that he \vas in
the arrned services at that ti1ne and \vas not discharged
fron1 the Veterans Hospital until Nov. 2, 1945, and that
he received no notice that she \vas asking to have all of
the property distributed to herself, ( tr. 37); that after
convalesing and after getting married, he made arrangernents with her (administratrix) to live in his father's
ho1ne, but that on Feb. 10, 1948, she sent Jean a letter
Ex. "G ", asking him to move out, ( tr. 38) ; that Jean
then wrote his letter, Ex. "H", stating that he figured
that descendant's children \vere entitled to part of the
estate; that "she \vas horrified at that suggestion",
(tr. 41); that later she offered us each $500.00" (tr. 42)
Appellant also fails to state that the other adult
.
heir, Phoebe L. Binghan1 and her husband, can1e up to
see the administratrix, when she started probate proceedings (tr. 48), and that she told them it \vould \vork
a hardship on her, requiring her to sell the business and
thus depriving her of a living, if the heirs should then
demand their share of the estate. That she would do
the right thing, and they didn't need to worry about
her doing the right thing ( tr. 49, 57).
Appellant also fails to note that after she offered
respondents $500 or $550 each, and because they didn't
accept her offer right there, she "rrote them a letter,
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Ex. ''I", stating that she had consulted her attorney,
'vho said they \Vere not entitled to anything, and no'v
they \vould take \Yhat she \vould give them and settle
on her ter1ns, ( tr. 53), and that shortly after that the
Petition for Citation \vas filed against her.
(2),

~-\.ppellant

further evades the real facts and

n1akes 1nisleading inferences and conclusions on pages

-± and 5.

It is true that a hearing was had on April

;), 1950, but it is not true that after that hearing, the
court, about :n1ay 22, 1950, ordered the administratrix
to file ne\v Inventory and Appraisement. The facts
are that after the hearing of April 5th, the lower court
announced: "I'll n1ake a finding that either as adlninistratrix or as trustee, all of the property referred to
in this proceeding, belonged to deceased and are assets
of the estate ( tr. 149); the court also stated that the
inventory \vas not sufficiently definite and that he wanted her to file an account.
All this happened long before May 22, 1950. That
\vas the date this Inatter came before the court on her
n1otion for further time in which to file her account
( tr. 157). The trial court granted her until J nne 5,
1950, to file her account of all the 1noney she had collected, and stated that on failure to do so, that judgment would be entered against her ( tr. 158).
(3) Appellant also neglects to state that in the fore
part of June, 1950, she did file her ''Final Account and
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Petition for Settlement Thereof'' in which she showed
and acknowledged cash receipts of $7 ,855.50, belonging
to the estate, as the court had previously found.
( 4) Appellant like\vise neglects to state that in her.

said final account she listed a nu1nber of improper items
as expenses, which the court listed and struck out, in
Par. 9 of the Findings of Fact, signed and filed December 22, 1950.
If the court will read ( tr. 158-164), it \Vill see \vhat
a difficult tilne petitioners and the lo\ver court had to
. get her to file an account of the 1noney, cash, which she
had collected, and also that she expected the court to
allo,,~ her a salary of $200 per month for 3 years,
$7200.00, \vhile she operated the business of the Linford
Upholstering Co., \vithout filing any account of the
earnings or operation of said business.
This court \vill also observe from the unverified
pencil account which she at last did file (which had no
vouchers or receipts of any kind to support it) and
\vhich we believe should have been stricken from the
files. But when her counsel admitted a s1nall net earning for the 3 year period, \Ve decided to accept it, in the
interest of a speedy settlement, as the court finds in
Par. 7 of its Findings of Fact.
It should also be noted that on November 2, 1950,
the administratrix flied her Petition for Distribution
of Estate, prayed that due notice be given and that ''all
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of the property of the said decedent 1nay be distributed to the above nan1ed heirs, to-,vit: Beatrice FJ. Linford

Sor~n~en~

and J an1e8

Jean H. Linford, Phoebe 1-l. Binghan1

St~phen

Linford as provided by law''.

It should also be noted that the lQwer court did
not ask for any further appraisenzent, just asked her
to file an inventory (tr. 156).

But that she never did

file a inventory of the piano and household furniture,
n~

petitioners n1oved that she be required to do, as noted
by the court in paragraph ± page 3 of the Findings of
Fact.
1

~-!R(;[rjf£ ~\'1~8 O~r

_._-!PPELLANT'S POINTS

Poiuti) 1-4. The first four points listed by appelant on page 6, are points \vhich were raised, argued to,
and settled by this court, in the first appeal, supra, and
said n1a tters are no'v settled, and cannot again be reargued in this e~tate.
Point :5. The court erred in including the Wm. Hansen contract as assets of said estate, - On page 12
counsel argues that the legal title to the pre1nises had
he en conveyed to Jean H. Linford and that he in turn
had conveyed it to Beatrice E. Linford, and thereby he
argues that she beca1ne the O\vner of the funds repre~ented by the contract, even though the contract was
pa~·able to the decedent, and hence she shouldn't be
required to account for the 1noney collected on the Wm.
FJ an sen con tract to huy said pre1nises. Even if the
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naked legal title had been conveved to her, that
oJ

'

alone~

we submit, would not be any reason why she should
not account for the money collected by her on the contract for the sale of the premises, which was payable
to the decedent and was considered to belong to him.
Such were the facts here, but appellant again avoids
the real facts.
Jean H. Linford testified that he had no interest
that property, that the money \vas payable to his
father (tr. 43). The administratrix admitted that at
the time of probate, she did not even knovv that the real
estate, represented by the Wm. Hansen contract, had
been put in her na1ne, and the trial court remarked:
'·I'll take that answer" ( tr. 143-4). She also expressly
adn1itted that, at the time decedent died, the $550.00
and all interest payable under the Wm. Hansen contract,
w'as payable to decedent and that she had collected all
of it.

111

Q. Why didn't you list the Hansen contract when

you knew it was payable to Linford~ A. I don't know·
\vhy I didn't list it (tr. 110). In addition, it should
be noted that the trial court answered her counsel
on this point as follows: ''The son took the title to
accomodate his father and then deeded it to Beatrice
E. Linford, she held it as trustee for her husband''
( tr. 151).

Point

6.

The court erred in including the insurance
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Inoney.

,,~ e spc~ no 1nerit to that argun1ent.

The ad-

Inini~tra.trix

ad1nitted she received $268.50 from petit·*
joner~ to apply on funeral expenses.
In her final
account, she takes and is allo,ved credit for the full
an1onnt of the funeral expenses, $387.35. Counsel gives
no reason 'vhY she should not account for the $268.50.
It certainly "Tas not a gift to her. She got that 1noney
fron1 petitioners under the representation to them that
here ''Tas not enough money in the estate to bury their
father.

Point 7. The court erred in including the $6000.00
received fron1 Wm. A Jones. On page 16 appellant.'s
counsel says: ''This money did not exist when decedent
died and 'vas therefore not part of the estate''. If
that argun1ent is sound, then no ad1ninistrator 'vould
be liable for any sale of conversion of estate's property
to his own use. For when the heirs complained, the
administrator could simply answer: ''The money I received for your father's property did not exist when
your father died, and therefore it is no part of his
estate".
Counsel repeats that the $6000.00, received frorr1
\~Vn1. A. Jones for sale of Linford Upholstery Co .. business including the real estate, "'vas a result of 3 years
of hard vvork on the part of Beatrice E. Linford''. There
is no evidence in the record to support that statement.
We have already pointed out that the administratrix
begged the heirs, at the time she started probate, not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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then to deinand their share of the estate, as that would
eon1pel her to sell the business and would thus deprive
her of a living. ( tr. 48, 49, 57). Neither did the administratrix, in her testimony make such a claim. She testified there was a growth in the business between the
time r~inford died and when she sold the business 3
years later ( tr. 146). She explained that this was due
largely to conditions brought on by the war, when people
could not buy new furniture, but had to have their
old furniture repaired. She also testified : ' 'At the time
of his death there "\vas work to be done in the shop.
He had gone out the night before he died and brought
in several pieces of furniture to be repaired, and I went
in there and helped 1\ir. ·Passy repair that furniture
and clean it up for customers' and I stayed and ran the
business ... In the 3 years that passed I 1nade a great
gro,vth in the business ( tr. 169). I didn't ask permission to operate the business ( tr. 116).
Regarding the question of fraud, the lo,ver court
observed: "'l,here never has been a petition filed for
leave to operate this business ... and never any account
filed ... I hesitate to make an express finding of direct
fraud, but to that extent, yes ( tr. 151). I find she
failed and neglected to ask leave of the court to operate a going business, and failed and neglected to account
to this court of her doings in the operation of that busIness. To that extent indirectly, the court makes a
finding of fraud, and that she took all of the proceeds
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and pocketed then1 out of the business" ( tr. 152)
Counsel con1plains that the court didn't allow her
a salary during the three years she operated the business. The trial court asked counsel to subn1it or produce authority sho,ving that the court "yas justified
in allowing her a salary \\There she had operated the
business of decedent 'vithout authority of court. Counsel failed to produce a single case so holding, and cite~
none in appellant's brief. We think the la\v is clearly
against such a contention.
In 33 C.J .S. page 1171, Sec. 193, the head note
reads: '• . .<\n executor or administrator may not engage
in business with funds of the estate, and if he does so
he is chargeable 'vith all losses incurred and profits
n1ade. '' In the text on the next page the rule is stated
thus:
''So great a breach of trust is it for the representative to engage in business with the funds'
of the estate that the law charges him with all
the losses thereby incurred without on the other
hand allowing him to receive the· benefit of any
profits which he may have made, the rule being that the persons beneficially interested in
the estate may either hold the representative
liable for the amount so used with interest, or
at their election may take all of the profits which
the representative has made by such unauthorized use of funds of the estate ... Since the representative cannot deal with the property to his own
advantage, he is not entitled to a salary for his
own services to be deducted from the gross receipts.
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In case at bar the adn1inistratrix not only fails to
render any accounting of her living expenses taken out
of that business during those 3 years, but she wants
the court to allo\v her a salary out of estate funds, with. out even rendering a proper account showing the net
earnings of the business during that three year period.
.A.t the bottom of page 17 and on 18 appellant again

argues that the grandchild, James Stephen Linford
not a proper party to the petition for citation filed
against her by respondents. That point was settled
by this court in the first appeal in this case, supra,
\vhere this court said:

\Yas

''There is no merit to the ~rgument made by
counsel that there is a defect and misjoinder of
parties to petition for citation because James S.
Linford, the aforementioned minor heir of deceased, was not made a party to the petition. It is
not necessary that he should have been joined as
a party. This is not an action against the administratrix, but rather a petition directing the
court's attention to certain alleged improper
fraudulent acts on the part of the administratrix,
and requesting that the court require her to properly administer the estate . . . ''
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS APPEAL
We think respondents Motion to Dismiss Appeal
should be granted for two reasons: (1) Appellant did
not make the grandchild James S. Linford a party to
this appeal and no notice of appeal has been served
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on hi1n or his guardian. if he has a guardian.
i~

This

an appeal fron1 a judg1nent and decree of distribu-

tion of estate,

"~here

the court granted and distributed

$1195.~)4

to each of the three heirs. The appellant
~eeks to reYerse and v-acate the said decree, hence this
appeal is just as n1uch an action against J a1nes S. Linford, as it is against Jean I-I. Linford or Phoebe L.
Bingha1n, for if appellant succeeds, the fruits and benefit of that dec.ree 'vill be 'viped out and set aside as to
all the heirs. Hence this appeal is really an action
against all of the heirs, for it seeks to take away the
benefit which the lower court avvarded to each of them.
Hence 've submit that James S. Lindford is a necessary party to this appeal, and that 'vithout making him
a party and vvithout any notice to him or his guardian,
this court is without jurisdiction to vacate and set aside
the findings of fact, conclusions of law and/ or the judgInent and decree of distribution, so far as the minor is
concerned.
In 34 C. J. S. pg. 926, Sec. 1814, it is stated that
proceedings for review of actions, by or against executor
or administrator, are governed by rules that govern
proceedings for review of civil actions. In 4 C. J. S.
pg. 854, Sec. 391, the rule is stated thus:
Generally all parties to the judgment or decree below whose interest will be directly affected, if the judgment or decree.is sustained, reversed, or modified on appeal or writ of error must
be made parties.
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In addition, it should be kept in mind that the lower
court specifically ordered that the 1ninor child or his
guardian should be given a copy of the. accounting and
notice of every proceeding by the administratrix ( tr.
156).. ln the Order and Judgment signed and filed
April 24, 1950, the lower court wrote the following: ''It
iH further ordered that James 8. Lindford be given
notieP of all proceedings or actions of said adn1inistratrix' '. rrhis order has also been ignored by appellant
and her councel.
(2), Our second reason why we think Motion to
Dis1niss Appeal should be granted is, that this appeal
'vas not taken in time. All the items complained of by
appellant \vere adjudged and settled by the court at
the conclusion of the hearing· of April 4-5 (tr. 149),
'vhen the trial court announced: '.'I'll make a finding
that either as administratrix or as trustee, all of the
property represented in this proceeding belonged to
the desceased and 'vere assets of the estate· ... Everything listed in the petition, because they were purchased
fron1 funds derived fro1n the business, or assets of the
estate at the tiine of his death".
The trial court even suggested that she might want
to take an appeal from the ruling: ''it may be gentlemen
that under these new rules you 1nay want to take an
interlocutory appeal before going ahead with this thing".
(Tr. 149) On April 24, 1950, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of I-.JR\V, Order and ,J udg1nent 'vas signed and filed.
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These findings cover and settle the n1atters herein colnplained of by the appellant. The only reason the court
didn •t then settle the amount to be distributed to each
heir, 'vas that the court asked her to file her accounting of her rash reciepts as found by the court, and also,
the court "ranted her to file an accounting covering the
three year period that she operated the business.
The Findings of Fact and Decree signed Dec. 22,
1950, is based on the findings of fact, conclusions of
la-\v and order signed and filed April 24, 1950, plus the
~1nall net earnings which she ad1ni tted over the 3 year
period, $1089.8±, as the court stated in Par. 7 of the
Findings of Fact. She isn't complaining about the
court adding the $1089.84. The matters of which she
con1plains \Yere settled and adjudged April 24, 1950,
and no appeal has been taken from those findings and
judgment then made by the court.
Hence we submit that the motion to dismiss the
appeal should also be made on this second ground, that
the appeal was not taken in time.
SUl\1~IARY

OF POINTS
To Summarize: Respondents submit that this appeal is wholly without merit and should be dismissed,
because:
. 1. The administratrix stands convicted of gross
neglect of duty, which practically amounts to fraud.
rrhu~ : (a), She admits collecting all of the six $100
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. .~riel Larsen mortgage notes payable to decedent, plus
$132 interest, total $732, but accounted for only $500;

(b) She ad1nits collecting the Wm. Hansen contract,
~~~G50, payable to the decedent, plus $105 interest, total
$65G, hut accounted for none of it. She likewise admits
receiving $268.50 from the heirs, to apply on funeral
expen~ses and like,vise failed to account for that: (c)
She admits that she operated the Linford Upholstering
Co. business without court authority and then sold it
for $6,000.00 cash, but failed to account for the $6,000.00
or any of the earnings of that business.
2. Counsel for appellant has presented no valid
reason \vhy the decree from which she appeals should
not be sustained. It is based on her own verified Final
Account and Petition for Settlement Thereof, filed in
June 1950, showing admitted cash receipts of $7855.50
belonging to the estate, and her pencil unverified account, filed about Nov. 2, by which her counsel admitted
a net earning of $1089.84, 'for the 3 year period, and her
Petition for Distribution of Estate, also filed Nov. 2,
1950.
3. In her said petition for distribution she alleges:
(1) That the entire estate has no'v ben reduced to cash
and that there is not now any property other than cash,
in the hands of the administratrix; (2) That the heirs
are entitled to have the entire estate distributed to them
as provided by law. Wherefore, she prayed that the
property be so distributed, \vhich is just what the court
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did. "~hen it distributed 1/3rd, $l7~l~1.91, to her, and the
balance, $3587.82 to the three heirs, $1195.94 to each.
So the distribution 1nade by the court is based on her
0\\711 accounts filed in court, and on her petition for distribution of the estate, n1oney in her hands, to the heirs,
n~ the la":r provides.

-±. In settling her accounts the lovver court, as vvell
as the heirs, \Yere very liberal to the administratrix;
(1) The court allo,ved all the deductions she set up and
clain1ed (although the same \Vere not supported by any
receipts or vouchers showing she had paid out that
1noney), except the court struck the four ite1ns mentioned by the court in its finding No. 9, which \vere
elearly illegal and not deductable as claims against the
estate; (2) We accepted her counsel's statement that
the net earnings for the three year period were only
$1089.84 (when in fact they were $1622.32 even by her
O\vn questionable account.), thus granting her further
advantage of $532.48; (3) In addition to that the
court allowed her extra compensation, $640.00, which
she was not entitled to under the Statute, Sec.
102-11-25 (U.C.A.), for she had not performed any
''extraordinary services'' as the basis for her extra
co1npensation, as provided. by that statute. She first
reported the estate as amounting to only $1072.40, and
she had all of the estate distributed to herself two
1nonths after the death of decedent.
5. Lastly, we submit this court has no jurisdiction
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and respondents' Motion to Dismiss Appeal should be
granted, for the two reasons above stated, to-wit: ( 1)
,J au1es S. ljinford is a beneficiary in said decree and is
therefore a necessary party to this appeal proceeding,
~eeking to Yaeate and set aside sairl decree; neither the
1uinor nor his guardian have been made a party to this
proceeding, nor has any notice of appeal been served
on either of them.
(2) The items complained of in this appeal, to-,vit:
(a) That the court charged her 'vith collection of the
'\:rn. Hansen contract, $655.00; (b) That the court
charged her \vith collections under the Arial Larsen
notes, $232.00; (c) That the court charged her 'vith
the $268.50 received fro1n the heirs to apply on funeral
expenses ; and (d) The court charged her 'vith the
$6,000.00, she received fro1n the sale of the business
jncluding the real estate, \vere all 1natters \vhich 'vere
found and decided by the trial court in its finding of
fact, conclusions of la'v and judgn1ent, signed and filed
..:\pril24, 1950, and fron1 which no appeal was ever taken.
That said n1atters have therefore become final, res adjudicata, and cannot no'v be brought before this court,
on appeal for reconsideration.
Respectfully

subn~itted,

LEON FONNESBECK
Attorney for Respondents.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

